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Abstract
In countries with poorly developed institutions, rent seeking may
impose serious costs for the economy. Our analysis demonstrates how
rent seeking distorts the economy through two channels. First, there
is the direct cost of the resources wasted in the rent seeking contest.
Second, rent seeking distorts firms’ investment decisions, and leads to
underinvestment. We conduct a case study of rent seeking in Iran in
order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Iran is an
interesting case, both because it is a rentier economy in the oil rich
Middle East, and because its political system is highly factionalized.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the phenomenon known as the “resource curse” shows that
countries rich in natural resources tend to have a slower economic growth
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than countries that have smaller natural resource endowments (see, for in-
stance, Sachs and Warner, 2001). The negative eﬀect of natural resources on
economic growth is particularly strong in countries with weak institutions.
Moreover, the curse is more severe for point source resources like oil than for
more dispersed natural resources like farmland (see Isham et al, 2002).
There are several possible explanations to the resource curse. One expla-
nation is that instability in the price of natural resources leads to large fluc-
tuations in government revenues. This may in turn lead to macroeconomic
instability, which adversely aﬀects economic growth. A second explanation
is that resource rents tend to reduce the size of the tradeable sector of the
economy. If technological progress is faster in this sector than in the non-
tradeable sector, these rents may harm growth. This is generally referred to
as the Dutch disease. A third hypothesis is that rents from natural resources
may lead to corruption and rent seeking. When revenues are controlled by
states with a limited degree of autonomy, the result may be a destructive
competition between interest groups to obtain a share of this income.
The present article analyses the impact of power struggles on the eﬃciency
of an oil rich economy. In particular, we focus on how the distribution of
strength between competing interest groups aﬀects economic outcomes. To
illustrate the logic of rent seeking, we have chosen to focus on Iran. Iran is
interesting in this context firstly because it is a rentier economy in the oil rich
Middle East, and secondly because its political system is highly factionalized.
Oil revenues in Iran represent about 60 percent of government revenues
and 34 percent of GDP. More than 80 percent of the country’s foreign ex-
change earnings are due to oil exports1. Politically, the division of power
between institutions with conflicting interests is not clearly defined. This
has made rivalry and political infighting endemic in the Islamic Republic.
Whereas the Shah was the undisputed leader of the Pahlavi monarchy, and
was able to implement growth oriented economic policies, the Islamic Repub-
lic has been paralyzed by power struggles between various political factions.
The result has been a lack of state autonomy, and poor economic growth.2
Oil revenues are not the country’s only source of rent. The development
policies applied since the 1960s have led to a massive growth in bureaucracy
1These numbers are from the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annual
Review, 1380 (2001/2002), Tehran, 2003.
2GDP per capita growth averaged -0.5 percent in the period 1983-1993, and 2.2 percent
in the period 1993-2003. Economic growth has been stronger in recent years, mainly due
to high oil prices.
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and state intervention in the economy. Before the growth of the bureaucracy,
most of the rent seeking was aimed at direct or indirect transfers of oil rev-
enues. But as the state grew larger, bureaucratic interventions created rents
from price distortions, taxes and subsidies, and regulations. These rents be-
came attractive targets for rent seekers. For instance, firms would lobby for
monopoly positions in the market or oﬀer bribes to avoid taxation. Rents
derived from bureaucratic interventions, which we shall refer to as regulation
rents, should be conceptually distinguished from oil rents.
Standard models of rent seeking typically deal with an exogenously given
rent, like oil rents. However, the rent that interest groups compete for may be
aﬀected by rent seeking itself. In our framework, the size of the regulation
rent is endogenous, created by investment. The idea is as follows. In a
country with weak institutions, there is an absence of credible commitment
regarding future policies. Once an investment is made, bureaucrats are free
to impose various types of taxes on the firm at their own will. Through
lobbying activities, a firm may reduce this tax burden. A well-connected
firm may even manage to reverse the financial flow, from a tax to a positive
net transfer. The abilities and eﬀorts of the actors in their competition to
influence the bureaucracy, determine their net tax position.
Since private property rights over income in this situation are not well
defined, a common pool problem arises. Firms realize that a share of the
income generated from their investments will be taxed away by bureaucratic
intervention, and respond by investing less. The distortions from rent seeking
are therefore twofold. Not only do economic actors waste resources fighting
over favors, but rent seeking also leads to underinvestment.
The theme of our formal model is related to Tornell and Lane (1999), who
analyse the “voracity eﬀect”. This eﬀect refers to the possibility that a wind-
fall gain, such as increased oil revenues, may lead to intensified rent seeking,
a more than proportional increase in fiscal redistribution, and lower growth.
The model presented here provides a much simpler framework for analysing
fiscal redistribution in a rent seeking economy. Moreover, we focus on asym-
metries in political strength between interest groups and policy implications.
Our paper is also related to Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik (2002),
who analyse how an increase in income from a natural resource may lead
to a reallocation of human capital from productive entreprenuership to rent
seeking. They demonstrate that, due to economies of scale in the productive
sector, the external inflow of resources may actually lead to a lower income
for the economy as a whole.
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
political factions in Iran, and their political and economic strengths. Section
3 presents a theoretical model of how the distribution of political influence
and economic privileges between interest groups aﬀect the intensity of rent
seeking. Section 4 provides a case study of rent seeking in Iran, based on
interviews and field work in the country. In section 5 we discuss how economic
policy reforms in Iran may aﬀect rent seeking. Section 6 concludes.
2 Political factions in Iran
The Iranian rent seeking economy is dominated by four main political fac-
tions. These factions can be categorized according to their positions on social
and economic aﬀairs. Liberal views on economic policy do not necessarily
imply liberal views on social issues, such as veiling and segregation of men
and women. Those who hold liberal views on economic policy but are in
favor of tight, social control, are generally referred to as conservatives. Their
economic stronghold lies within the bazaar (mainly imports) and the reli-
gious foundations (bonyads).3 Politically, their power is due to control over
the most important political institutions, including the Guardian Council,
the Council of Experts, and their close association with the Leader of the
Revolution.
A second important faction is what we may call pragmatic conservatives.
Like the conservatives, they are in favor of a market based economy, but
regarding social questions, their views are more liberal. The pragmatic con-
servatives have their economic base in real estate, manufacturing, and export
processing zones. Political power is derived from the influence of leading per-
sonalities like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezai, president
and vice-president of the Expediency Council, respectively.
The third influential faction is the neoconservatives. The neoconserv-
atives are mostly a younger generation of revolutionaries, many with back-
ground in the Revolutionary Guards, who seek the re-ideologisation of Iranian
politics. They defend the earlier goals of the revolution, including an author-
3The religious foundations are economic conglomerates with activities in sectors like
finance, tourism, imports/exports and manufacturing. To promote their “revolutionary”
and “altruistic” mission, the bonyads are exempted from taxes and government control.
They also receive direct transfers through the budget. According to some estimates, the
bonyads control as much as 40% of the non-oil economy (see Maloney, 2000).
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itarian state structure, a state centered economic system, and a messianic
foreign policy. Their economic power comes from smuggling, development
projects and the arms industry. Politically, the neoconservatives control
the 7th parliament (2004-2008) and form the core of the coercive system.
Through the process of crushing student demonstrations and reformist op-
position, the various branches of the police and para-military forces have
gained increasing influence.
The fourth main political group is the reformists. Under the leadership
of President Khatami (1997-2005), they have increased social liberties and
called for democratization. Historically, the reformists were strong advocates
of state led development. Today, however, this group has no uniform position
on economic issues. Their economic power outside the state apparatus ap-
pears to be weak. But through their control over the government, they have
exerted significant influence on the economic arena. Politically, their power
is due to popular support, as manifested in the 1997 and 2001 presidential
elections. Table 1 illustrates the positions of the factions.
Table 1. Main political factions
Economic left Economic right
Social left Reformists* Pragmatic conservatives
Social right Neoconservatives Conservatives
* Reformists vary in their position on economic issues.
We now turn to a formal analysis of how the distribution of political
influence and economic privileges between interest groups aﬀect the intensity
of rent seeking in society.
3 The model
The number of interest groups in the model is given by N . We refer to these
interest groups as firms. The firms make two sequential decisions. First, they
make an investment decision. Second, they determine their amount of rent
seeking.
We start by describing the rent-seeking contest. Our formulation of rent
seeking is standard, as found in Nitzan (1994) and Mehlum and Moene
(2001). Let R denote the size of the rent in the economy. The objective
function guiding firm j’s rent seeking eﬀort is given by:
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vj = ρjR− αjqj, ρj =
qj
Q
and Q =
NX
i=1
qi, (1)
where ρj is the share of the rent captured by firm j, qj is this firm’s rent
seeking eﬀort, and αj is the marginal cost of rent seeking facing the firm,
capturing the firm’s eﬃciency in rent seeking. Assuming an interior solution,
the first order condition for each group is given by:
∂vj
∂qj
=
Q− qj
Q2
R− αj = 0, (2)
which results in an equilibrium share of rent given by:
ρj = 1−
αjQ
R
. (3)
Inserting (3) in (1), we find the equilibrium income of firm j, net of rent
seeking expenses, as:
vj = Rρ2j . (4)
In equilibrium, using the fact that
PN
i=1 ρi = 1, (3) can be expressed as:
ρj = 1−
αj (N − 1)
α¯N
, (5)
where α¯ is the average level of rent seeking eﬃciency in the economy.
Clearly, firm j’s share of the rents is a negative function of its marginal rent
seeking costs relative to the average level in the economy, and a negative
function of the number of rent seekers. For the economy as a whole, income
net of rent seeking expenses is given by:
NX
i=1
vi = R
NX
i=1
ρ2i . (6)
If we denote the exogenously given oil rent by B, so that R = B in (6), oil
income net of rent seeking costs for the country as a whole can be expressed
as:
IB = B
NX
i=1
ρ2i . (7)
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We now turn to the case of an endogenous rent, determined by the firms’
investment decisions. An investment gives rise to income. Through various
types of interventions, such as taxes and subsidies, bureaucrats redistribute
this income between the firms. When these policies are at the discretion of
the bureaucracy, property rights over income from investment are not well
defined. Indeed, each firm can be seen as contributing to a common pool of
income. This leads to a common pool problem, resulting in underinvestment.
The common pool problem is aggravated by the fact that firms use resources
trying to influence the distribution of the common pool of income.
Let kj measures investment by firm j, and f (kj) be the income gener-
ated from this investment. We assume identical technology across firms, and
make the standard assumption of positive but decreasing marginal product
of capital, i.e., f 0 (kj) > 0, f 00 (kj) < 0. The cost of capital to firm j is rj,
which is exogenous to the model. We can think of rj as a policy parameter,
determined by an autonomous government agency outside the control of rent
seeking.
The capital investment is a sunk cost for the firms at the rent seeking
stage of the game. Hence, total income generated by the firms’ investments,
given by Y =
PN
i=1 f (ki), represents the potential regulation rent in the
economy. In practice, however, the actual regulation rent may be lower than
the potential rent, for at least two reasons. First, income generated by the
firms is a more dispersed source of rent than a point source oil rent. Hence,
it may be impossible or exceedingly costly for the bureaucracy to access
the entire, potential regulation rent. Second, property rights may protect at
least a share of firms’ returns from investment from the redistribution policies
of the bureaucracy. In the following we assume that a share γ of Y can be
transferred between firms through bureaucratic intervention. A share (1− γ)
of the non-oil sector is thus not exposed to rent seeking. The government
may be able to lower γ by strengthening institutions that protect private
property rights. Income generated in the non-oil sector is given by:
M (k) = (1− γ)
NX
i=1
f (ki) , (8)
where k = (k1, ..., kN). The share of non-oil income that is exposed to rent
seeking, and which therefore constitutes the regulation rent in the economy,
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is given by:
A (k) = γ
NX
i=1
f (ki) . (9)
Using the fact that R = A (k) together with (6), we can express the
regulation rent, net of rent seeking costs, as:
A˜ (k) = γ
NX
i=1
ρ2i f (ki) . (10)
Income net of rent seeking costs from the non-oil sector of the economy
can therefore be found as:
IA =M (k) + A˜ (k) =
NX
i=1
£¡
1− γ + γρ2i
¢
f (k∗i )
¤
, (11)
where k∗i denotes the equilibrium level of investment, to be derived be-
low. When a firm makes its investment decision, it realized that only a share
(1− γ) of the returns to its investment is safe from various forms of “grab-
bing” activities from outside parties. It therefore only controls an amount
(1− γ) f (kj) of its investment. A share γ of its investment is a contribution
to the common pool of income, which is subject to rent seeking and distrib-
uted amongst the firms according to their relative influence. From (4) we see
that its income from this pool of income is given by vj = ρ2jA (k). Hence, firm
j’s objective function at the investment stage of the game can be expressed
as:
πj = (1− γ) f (kj)− rjkj + ρ2jA (k) . (12)
Maximizing (12) with respect to kj, the first order condition can be ex-
pressed as:
f 0 (kj) =
rj
γρ2j + (1− γ)
, (13)
which defines the optimal level of investment, k∗j , for firm j. The de-
nominator captures the investment distortion due to rent seeking (the first
term in the denominator) and the common pool problem (the second term
in the denominator). In other words, if an investment generates one dollar
of income, part of this dollar will be taxed away by the redistributive polices
and part of it will be taxed away due to increased rent seeking.
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If one group, j, say, has all political control, we see from (13) that ρj =
1 ⇒ f 0 (kj) = rj. For any i 6= j, the first order condition would in this case
be given by f 0 (ki) = ri/ (1− γ), which implies underinvestment since these
firms only keep a share (1− γ) of the income generated from investment.
Hence, with one firm having full control at the rent seeking stage of the
game, there will be no resource wasting rent seeking contest, but as long as
γ > 0, there will still be underinvestment. If γ = 0, there are no regulation
rents, f 0 (kj) = rj. An increase in γ leads to a reduction in investment and
therefore a reduction in net income, IA.
4 Numerical examples and discussion
To illustrate the properties of the model, we simplify by considering the case
of two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. The share of the rent accruing to firm 1 is
given by ρ, and to firm 2 by (1− ρ). The production technology is given by
f (ki) = ln ki.
4.1 Exogenous versus endogenous rent
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of rent seeking with an endogenous and exoge-
nous rent. The horizontal axis measures ρ, the relative strength of firm 1 in
the rent seeking contest, which from (5) we observe is a function of the dis-
tribution of rent seeking costs between the firms. The two firms are assumed
to have identical capital costs, i.e., r1 = r2 = r. Given this cost of capital,
in the absence of rent seeking, investment creates an income given by the
Y -line. If γ = 1, which can be interpreted as a situation with very weak
political institutions, Y also gives the potential for transfers between firms,
and is therefore in this case identical to the regulatory rent. Income net of
rent seeking is given by IA, with the subscript A indicating that the rent is
an endogenously determined regulatory rent. The superscripts indicate the
value of γ, so that the I1/2A -curve shows the case of γ = 1/2, and so on. If
γ = 0, of course, I0A = Y . The loss in income due to regulatory rent seeking
is given by (Y − IA). Clearly, net income from the non-oil economy falls with
γ.
The IB-line shows net income from the exogenous oil rent. In the figure,
potential income from oil, i.e., the oil rent, is given by Y , identical to potential
income from the non-oil economy. The amount of oil rent dissipation is
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given by (Y − IB). We note that for a given rent Y , the income loss from
rent seeking is larger if investment decisions are endogenous, i.e., I1A < IB.
Hence, while the challenges of handling an oil rent has received a lot of
attention in the literature, our analysis shows that, everything else equal,
the destructive competition for regulatory rents may be even more damaging
for the economy.
An improvement in private property rights protection, as captured by a
reduction in γ, increases the net income due to investment. For suﬃciently
good protection of investors’ profits, rent dissipation may be less serious for
the regulation rent than for the oil rent. For instance, I1A < I
1/2
A < IB for any
ρ. However, reducing γ, we see that I1/4A > IB for intermediate values of ρ,
and I1/4A < IB for a more unbalanced rent seeking competition. Intuitively,
when only a small share of the returns from investment are subject to rent
seeking, firms’ investment decisions are relatively insensitive to changes in ρ
and thereby insensitive to changes in the intensity of rent seeking.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ρ
 IA1/2
 IA1/4
 IA1
IB
Y
Figure 1: Exogenous versus endogenous rents
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From Figure 1 we also see that net income reaches its lowest level for
ρ = 0.5, i.e., when the two parties have equal strength in the rent seeking
contest. With equal opportunities in investment, as given by identical capital
costs, equal strength in rent seeking is achieved when their political influence
is the same, i.e., when α1 = α2. The observation that rent dissipation is at
its largest when the interest groups are equally strong, is a standard result in
the rent seeking literature. In Iran, the power balance between the political
factions has always been very tight. No single group has ever been able to
outplay the others and gain a power monopoly. In light of the theoretical
predictions, destructive competition in Iran can be expected to be fierce.
Figure 2 below shows total net income for a country with an oil rent of
Y and a potential non-oil income of equal size. The quality of institutions
is assumed to be γ = 1/2. The upper curve gives I1/2A + IB. Oil revenues
clearly increase the potential income of the country. This is captured by the
shift in the income potential line from the dashed Y to the solid 2Y line.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ρ
 IA1/2
 IB+IA1/2
IB
Y
2Y
Figure 2: Exogenous and endogenous rents
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4.2 Economic policy reform
We consider two types of economic policy reform, one targeted at the capital
market, for instance by deregulation of the banking sector, and one broad
based reform, seeking to strengthen the protection of property rights.
Consider first the capital market reform. With the capital cost being
identical for both firms, lowering this cost leads to an increase in the income
potential from investment. In Figure 3 this is captured by a shift from the
Y -line to the Y 0-line. The net income line shifts upward from I1/2A to I
01/2
A .
Part of the eﬀect of the reform on income will be crowded out by rent seeking,
as evident from the fact that the increase in net income is much smaller than
the increase in potential income.
Consider next a reform that strengthens property rights, captured by
a reduction in γ. This leads to a shift from I1/2A to I
1/4
A . In specific case
illustrated in Figure 3, we see that strengthening property rights is more
eﬀective in increasing net income relative to the targeted credit market reform
for intermediate values of ρ, more precisely for ρ ∈ (ρa, ρb). Outside this
interval, lowering the interest rate is more eﬃcient.
Intuitively, for intermediate values of ρ, rent seeking is very intense. A
policy reform aimed at reducing rent seeking, which is what strengthening
property rights does, is then very eﬀective. This should be contrasted with
a reduction in interest rates, which stimulates more investment. When rent
seeking is fierce, much of the increased income potential from this reform will
be wasted in intensified destructive competition. On the other hand, when ρ
is closer to one of the extremes, rent seeking is less intense. It may then be
more fruitful to introduce a policy that creates a larger potential income.
Given that policy competition in Iran has been very intense in recent
years, our analysis shows that institutional reforms that provide greater se-
curity for firms’ investments are important to improve economic output. Pol-
icy reforms that seek to stimulate the income potential of the economy, like
deregulation of the banking sector, may well have more limited eﬀect. Much
of the gain from the latter kind of reform will be dissipated through an in-
crease in destructive competition.
4.3 Asymmetry in capital costs
In the numerical examples so far, the two firms have been assumed to have
identical capital costs. Consider now the case of asymmetry between firms in
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Figure 3: Credit market versus property rights policies
terms of their capital costs, keeping everything else as above. Assume that
diﬀerences in the capital cost are due to political decisions, with one firm
receiving subsidized credit and the other not. Let firm 1 be the privileged
firm in this respect, so that r1 < r2. In Figure 4, net income with asymmetric
capital costs is given by the I 0A-curve, while the IA-curve shows the case of
identical capital costs. In the figure, the potential income is the same in both
cases.
We see from Figure 4 that IA > I 0A for ρ < 0.5. In this range of ρ,
the firm receiving subsidized loans, firm 1, is the firm with a lower rent
seeking eﬃciency. Intuitively, when the economic advantage is balanced by
a disadvantage in the rent seeking contest, the balance of power between the
two firms leads to intense rent seeking. For ρ > 0.5, net income is higher
with the capital market distortion, i.e., IA < I 0A. In this case, firm 1 has
an advantage both in the capital market and in the rent seeking contest,
and this imbalance of power between the two firms reduces rent seeking and
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Figure 4: Capital cost asymmetry
economic waste.
We also see that the net income associated with maximum rent seeking is
lower with the capital market distortion than without it, i.e., I 0A (ρ = 0.3) <
IA (ρ = 0.5). Intuitively, for low values of ρ, most of the investment is un-
dertaken by the firm facing the higher capital cost, and hence the level of
investment in the economy is low.
If diﬀerences in interest rates reflect political decisions, it is reasonable
to assume that there exists a negative link between a firm’s influence in the
rent seeking contest and the interest it pays on its loans. An influential firm
is likely to have more easy access both to cheap loans and to privileges as-
sociated with rent seeking. If this is the case, we are likely to be at some
point where ρ > 0.5, implying that the credit market distortion is good for
the economy. An interesting implication of the model is thus that liberaliza-
tion of credit markets, implying a harmonization of interest rates, may well
reduce the net income of the economy. It does so by creating a larger degree
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of balance between the two interest groups, thus intensifying rent seeking.
An important insight from the present analysis is therefore that policies that
“level the playing field” between the rent seeking groups is likely to be coun-
terproductive.
5 Channels for rent seeking in Iran
There are several channels for rent seeking in Iran. Not all of these are
related to oil. According to the World Bank (2003), Iran has one of the most
concentrated industry structures in the world. There are also pervasive price
distortions in the economy. Both of these factors create regulatory rents.
The most important channels for distributing oil rents are development
projects and subsidized loans. One way to create rents from development
projects such as dams, roads, and hospitals, is for the bureaucrats running the
project to make a generous estimation of the project’s costs. The diﬀerence
between the oﬃcial cost of the project and the actual cost may then be split
between the contractor and the bureaucrats.
Concerning subsidized loans, these are typically administered by state
development banks to promote investment projects in peripheral regions.
Well-connected entrepreneurs can get access to such loans, and use the money
for completely other purposes than those intended. Thus, subsidized loans
for raising chicken in the remote region of Baluchistan, for instance, may well
end up as property investments in Tehran.4
The regulatory rents are a reflection of the extent of state intervention
in the economy. Due to a lack of transparency, taxes can be avoided and
regulations bypassed. For instance, in Tehran, the Mayor’s oﬃce has been
selling permissions to exceed the legal number of floors in housing projects. In
one of our interviews, we were informed that the entrepreneur paid an extra
120 000 USD to expand his building from two to five floors. Competition
for positions in the Mayor’s oﬃce and similar jobs in the bureaucracy, is
fierce. Similarly, firms spend resources to court bureaucrats in order to obtain
privileges and favors.
4The subsidy element, and therefore the rent, can be substantial. Currently, the Bank
of Industry and Mining oﬀers an interest rate of 11 percent. For talented rent seekers,
this rate may be negotiated down to 7 percent. With an inflation rate in today’s Iran
of approximately 16 percent, loans carrying a nominal interest rate of 7 percent give a
negative real interest rate of 9 percent.
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Another regulatory rent is derived from trade barriers. Tariﬀs create a
wedge between world prices and domestic prices, and thus a premium for
those who can avoid the tariﬀ. Avoiding tariﬀs can be achieved through lob-
bying or through smuggling. Thirdly, there are monopolies in the imports
and distribution of basic consumer goods such as sugar, tea, rice, and to-
bacco. While there is no legal foundation for these monopolies, they are held
by quasi-statal actors, and de facto sanctioned by the state, and can thus
reasonably be considered as regulatory rents.
The negative impacts of rent seeking on the economy are obvious. Costs
and prices are higher than necessary, delays are frequent, and quality is often
poor. As way of illustration, consider the following case.
5.1 The airport
The building of the Imam Khomeini airport in Tehran started in the 1960s,
with the purpose of servicing international flights, leaving national flights
to the smaller Mehrabad airport. Inaugurated in May 2004 in the presence
of the President and other government oﬃcials, the celebration came to an
end when divisions from the Revolutionary Guard interfered. After the first
flight had arrived, they blocked the runway with 30 minibuses, forcing an
Iran Air flight from Dubai to pull up and return. The airplane later landed
in Isfahan.5 The airport has since been closed.
The background for the interference by the Revolutionary Guards was
as follows. A Turkish-led consortium, Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV), had won the
tender for running the airport. A company headed by the Revolutionary
Guards had also participated in this tender, but lost. Protesting against the
government’s decision, they claimed that the Turkish presence at the airport
represented a security risk. The real motive behind their reaction, however,
appears to have been diﬀerent. At Mehrabad airport, the Revolutionary
Guards have their own terminal, where smuggled goods can be brought into
the country. With international flights now moving to the new airport, they
demand similar facilities there. The government, being dominated by re-
formists, opposed their demands and chose the Turkish company. This is
when the Revolutionary Guards decided to react.
The Revolutionary Guards is an actor with great economic and political
5See www.iran-press-service.com, May 8, 2004, “Tehran new international airport shut
by the army”.
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power in Iran. They form the core of the country’s security system, and
are heavily armed. Economically, they are engaged in various large scale
development projects, like building roads, dams, etc. The weapon industry
is under their control. In addition, they control much of the country’s illegal
trade.
The struggle for control over the airport illustrates in a clear way the
losses from rent seeking. A large airport has been built and is ready for use.
But because of a power struggle, it cannot be utilized.6
5.2 The petroleum fund
Another illustration of rent dissipation in Iran is given by the fate of the pe-
troleum fund. Since the debt crisis in 1993, stabilizing the flow of oil revenues
to the economy has been a major policy concern. The Rafsanjani govern-
ment (1989-1997) established a foreign exchange reserve account (hesab-e
zakhire-ye arzi) to protect the economy from fluctuations in the oil price.
The intention was to invest the oil fund in international capital markets.
However, due to low oil prices in the second half of the 1990s, the size of
the account was insignificant. With the rise in oil prices from 1999, savings
picked up. But now the third development plan announced that half of the
account should be spent on private investment projects inside the country.
The responsibility of administrating this activity was given to the Plan and
Budget Organization (sazmane barname va budje), later renamed to The
Plan and Management Organization (sazmane barname va mudiriat). Both
the size of the account administered by this organization and the guidelines
for allocating subsidized credit to private investment projects are unclear.
Hence, the possibilities of abuse are significant.
In the elections of February 2004, the reformists lost their majority in the
Parliament. Knowing that their conservative rivals would take over control
over the Parliament by June 2004, they started emptying the remaining fifty
percent of the foreign exchange reserve. It should be noted that the emptying
of the oil fund came at a time when the oil prices were historically high. Under
normal circumstances, this should imply an accumulation of funds, not their
depletion.
6According to the Chairman of the State Aviation Organization, Hassan Hajalifard,
about 244 billion toman has been spent on the project, see Iran International Monthly
Magazine no. 29, May 2004, pages 96-99, www.netiran.com
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The experience with the oil stabilization fund illustrates the problem of
sheltering oil revenues from political infighting. Eager to promote their own
interests and opposing those of rival groups, the diﬀerent factions have strong
incentives to spend the oil revenues. The fund has thus failed to stabilize the
economy.
6 Policy reform
Several economic policy reforms have been undertaken since 1989. The major
goals of the first development plan (1989-1994) were the unification of the
exchange rate system, liberalization of the financial system, privatization of
state owned companies, reduction of subsidies, and deregulation of foreign
trade. Most of these reforms, however, were not implemented according to
the plan. For instance, in 1992, the exchange rate was unified. Liberalized
imports combined with low oil prices led to increased trade deficits and to the
accumulation of USD 23 billion in foreign debt. As a consequence, the riyal
plummeted and the government re-imposed the system of multiple exchange
rates. The import barriers that had been lifted in the early 1990s were
reinstalled.
This example shows that policy reform in Iran is sensitive to fluctuations
in the oil price. When the oil price is high, the government deregulates the
economy, whereas a low oil price generally gives the opposite result. In the
first case, the supply of foreign exchange to the economy is high, reducing the
price of imports. The volume of imports can increase without accumulation
of foreign debt. In the latter case, the local currency depreciates and the price
of imports therefore increases. In addition to weakening the current account,
the depreciated currency increases the cost of domestic production. The
manufacturing sector in Iran is highly dependent on imported intermediates
and capital equipment, and the production is largely for the local market. In
order to protect local industry and reduce the spending of foreign exchange,
the policy response to lower oil prices is typically increased tariﬀ barriers and
introduction of currency rationing.
Rent seeking is also aﬀected by fluctuations in the oil price. The standard
assumption is that rent seeking increases with a rise in the oil price, since
the size of the oil rent goes up. Inversely, a drop in the oil price should lead
to less rent seeking. Interestingly, however, in Iran this is not necessarily so.
Since the policy response to a lower oil price is more regulation, rent seeking
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directed towards regulation rents is likely to increase. When oil prices go
up, the rent-creating regulations are lifted, but at the same the amount of
oil rent goes up. The degree of rent seeking in the economy may therefore
be relatively unaﬀected by changes in oil revenues, though the type of rent
seeking changes.
According to the logic of our model, there are two ways of reducing rent
seeking in the economy. Firstly, by one of the competing groups gaining full
control over the state apparatus. In this case, there will no longer be room for
destructive competition over rents. Such a solution would replicate the situ-
ation in Indonesia under Suharto, where an omnipotent leader monopolized
corruption and generated economic growth. In the long run, however, this
may not be the optimal solution, since political hegemony tends to reduce
innovation.
The second way of removing rent seeking is by eliminating the power of
rent seeking groups and establishing an autonomous state. This can take
place through a process of democratization, where greater transparency and
accountability reduce the scope for rent seeking. An important lesson from
the growth literature is that sound institutions are essential for economic
development. By professionally managing the oil rent and creating oppor-
tunities for all, the destructive competition that has plagued the Iranian
economy for decades can turn constructive.
Of these two scenarios, we believe the second one to be the more realistic
outcome. The Islamic Republic has been haunted by internal power struggles
since its creation in 1979. No single leader or faction seems to have the
strength to take complete control. The destructive competition between
various political actors will most likely continue. The only force that can
challenge this deadlock is a push for democratization from below.
7 Concluding comments
Countries richly endowed with natural resources often have low growth rates.
One explanation to the “natural resource curse” is rent seeking. The present
article has analysed rent seeking both from a theoretical angle, and from an
applied angle, using Iran as a case. Our theoretical analysis has demonstrated
that not only oil rents, but also regulatory rents, may create rent seeking.
Indeed, by reducing the incentive for investment, regulatory rents created
by discretionary bureaucratic interventions in the market, may have an even
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more damaging eﬀect on the economy than oil rents.
The power balance between the political factions in Iran has always been
very tight. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that rent seeking under
such conditions can be expected to be fierce, with significant, negative ef-
fects on the economy. In this environment of intense rent seeking, institu-
tional reforms that provide greater security for firms’ investments may be
more productive than policy reforms that seek to stimulate the income po-
tential of the economy, like capital market deregulation. Indeed, much of
the potential gain from deregulation can be expected to disappear through
intensified destructive competition.
Not only may policy reforms such as liberalization of credit markets have
limited eﬀect. Our analysis has demonstrated that such reforms may in fact
be counterproductive. Policies that equalize the economic power base of the
rent seeking factions may well lead to intensified rent seeking and thereby
reduced net income for the economy.
Another interesting observation relates to the eﬀect of changes in oil prices
on rent seeking. Intuitively, one would expect that a rise in oil prices would
trigger more rent seeking, as the size of the oil rent increases, and likewise,
a drop in the oil price should lead to less rent seeking. However, this may
not necessarily be the case. Since the policy response to a lower oil price
typically is more regulation, rent seeking directed towards regulation rents
is likely to increase. When oil prices go up, the rent-creating regulations are
lifted, but at the same the amount of oil rent goes up. While aﬀecting the
type of rent seeking in the economy, the total amount of rent seeking may
well be relatively unaﬀected by changes in oil revenues.
How can the destructive competition characterizing Iran’s political and
economic arenas turn productive? One possibility is that one group gains a
dominant position in the political system. In Iran , however, no single leader
or faction seems to have the strength to take complete control. It appears to
us that the only force that can challenge the current political and economic
deadlock is a push for democratization from below. With an increasingly
impatient population, demanding political reform, the power of the present
rent seekers may be in for a fall.
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